



THE COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT or community in the United
States raises a host of concerns about exclusion, social fabric, control,
and governance.' It is a permutation and extension of the private cov-
enant relationship between private landowners, designed to ensure (or
guard against) certain uses of land with which public land use controls
in the form of zoning, land development, and building controls fail to
deal. At bottom a private contractual relationship affecting land be-
tween a promissor (usually a buyer of an interest in land) and a prom-
issee (usually a seller of an interest in land), the so-called "real" cov-
enant lasts (is enforceable) beyond the lives or ownership interests of
the original parties to the covenant, "running with the land" on both
the burden and benefit side, with the interests of the land as they are
transferred by the original parties to subsequent buyers, devisees, and
other transferees. Thus, for example, if A, the owner of a 2-acre parcel,
sells I acre to B on condition that B build only a single-family residence
not to exceed one story or 15 feet in height, colored only some shade
of white and only with a red-tile roof, then that is the only use which
B can make of that 1-acre parcel unless prevented from doing so by
public laws, which may restrict the use even further. Moreover, anyone
buying the one-acre parcel so restricted is bound by B's promise, and
anyone purchasing A's remaining one-acre parcel may enforce it, even
though neither of these parties so promised each other.
A major user of such real covenants is the property developer of
large residential communities who wishes to guarantee a certain mea-
sure of uniformity (or difference) in the houses that make up its pro-
jected residential community. Commonly known as "covenants, con-
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ditions and restrictions" (CC&Rs), the land developer will append a
list of covenants dealing with homeowner assessments, design controls,
and use and upkeep of common areas such as private roads, parks, and
recreational facilities both to whatever plan or plat of subdivision local
government authorities require to be filed as a condition of land de-
velopment, as well as to the deed to each lot or house sold. Sometime
following the selling of the last lot (or the construction of the last home
if the developer is building them) the developer transfers the enforce-
ment function to some sort of association of homeowners, thus forming
what the ALI Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes calls a "com-
mon interest community."'2 The elected board of directors of that com-
mon interest community then sees to the enforcement of the CC&Rs
in accordance with the terms and the bylaws of the association. The
common interest community closely approximates in many ways a
small municipal government as it maintains private streets and parks,
provides homeowner security, and collects homeowner assessments for
the purpose of financing the aforesaid activities.
Professor Michael Heller examines the theoretical basis for common
interest communities in Common Interest Developments at the Cross-
roads of Legal Theory.3 The intersection, according to Heller, is be-
tween the axis of rights allocation and the axis of governance institu-
tions. We have posed here, in other words, a collective action dilemma,
or CAD. He places the CID in the context of other methods for solving
"blended, intermediate level collective action dilemmas." He points out
that liberal commons forms include not only CIDs but also corpora-
tions, partnerships, family property, trusts, and co-ownership. Heller
sees CIDs as particularly useful as a group resources regime that solves
complex problems of property governance-in other words, classic ex-
amples of a successful liberal commons.
In her article on Privatization and Its Discontents,4 Professor Paula
Franzese describes the parade of horribles that passes for common in-
terest community regulation. Observing first that 50 million of us live
in 250,000 covenanted communities (that's nearly 20 percent of the
population), Franzese describes the CID or CIC as "government for the
nice." Rules go beyond exterior design, extending not only to interiors
(piles of magazines are a no-no) but to guest appearance (no flip-flops
in the elevators) and even the weight of pets (when allowed at all).
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Such private regulation-even if technically agreed-to by the home-
owner-result in unwarranted intrusion into the lives of residents far
beyond what was envisioned in the common law of covenants and
servitudes. Franzese points us toward limited state reform of CICs in
Nevada, Florida, Arizona, and California as well as suggestions from
the ALI Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, and relevant anal-
ogy to state ethics reform in states like New Jersey, as promising ave-
nues of investigation.
In Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step,5 Pro-
fessor Susan French draws on her wealth of accumulated experience as
reporter for the aforementioned ALI Restatement: Servitudes project to
suggest further reform of the CIC. French commences by noting that
there is an inherent contradiction in the added value that owners in
CICs are likely to obtain and what increasingly financially strapped
communities require the CIC developer to provide. While the home-
owner may well obtain more by pooling assets and sharing resources
than she could obtain separately, local government usually forces the
CIC developer to assume a greater share of infrastructure/public facility
burdens such as streets, parks, water, sewer, and so forth, than those
developing outside a CIC.
These and other factors lead French to conclude that CICs are in-
creasingly like private governments, though she is quick to point out
that there are significant differences as well. After setting out relevant
portions of the 1998 Restatement that would help guarantee at least a
measure of due process for homeowners plagued with an overzealous
regulatory association, French nevertheless observes that most home-
owners in CICs are ultimately left to the mercy of courts for redress-
a process that is both time-consuming and costly. French suggests state
statutory reform providing, inter alia, an alternate venue (to the courts)
in settling CIC disputes coupled with a training program for CIC gov-
ernance, both of which were recommended in 2004 by the California
Law Revision Commission, together with the creation of a Common
Interest Community Development Bureau to provide more general sup-
port to California's 36,000 common interest communities.
Reform of CICs appears to be in the air. At some point, standards
more appropriate to public governance of the use of land may in some
measure need to be engrafted onto the private running covenant body
to forge a new theory of CIC governance. Thus, for example, why
should a neighbor be forced to accept a dwelling next door that violates
5. 37 URB. LAW. 359 (2005).
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applicable covenants on height, design, color, and lot coverage because
an association design committee grants a series of variances as per-
mitted under an "exceptions" paragraph so permitting, and to which all
residents of the CIC are signatory? Public land use controls would
require demonstration of unique hardship and minimal effect on neigh-
boring property owners. Without such standards, what value are the
covenants in the first place?
